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Introduction
Monetary policy hinges upon the management of expectations. Woodford (2003, p. 15 ) characterises this view as "not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least under current conditions, very little else matters". In inflation-targeting economies, expectations about key macroeconomic variables including inflation, output growth and policy interest rates are of wide interest to policy makers, analysts and forecasters. Two important measures of private-sector expectations are survey expectations and expectations inferred from market pricing. The two measures have different benefits and shortcomings. Survey-based measures are often criticised for their lack of financial incentives for respondents to give thoughtful forecasts; see, for example, Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2005) . Measures based on market pricing, on the other hand, are sensitive to empirical assumptions about credit spreads and risk premia. For example, interest-rate and inflation expectations inferred from derivatives contracts and bond yields rely upon assumptions about risk premia that are difficult to observe in good times and even harder to assess during times of financial turbulence; see Galati et al. (2011) for a discussion.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the forecasting properties of survey and market-based policy interest-rate expectations in Sweden. The analysis speaks to several questions. First, do privatesector expectations possess reasonable properties? For example, bias is a warning sign and inefficiency signals shortcomings in the way expectations are formed or measured. Second, which expectations should policy makers rely upon when the various measures of expectations do not coincide?
Here, the relative forecast precision of the measures might be informative. In recent years, discrepancies between survey-and market-based expectations measures have arisen in several countries, including Sweden. Figure A1 in the appendix -which replicates parts of the information of a figure from the Riksbank's October 2010 Monetary Policy Report -illustrates the discrepancy between the survey-based and market-based expectations as well as the discrepancy with the Riksbank's own interest-rate forecast.
Third, and most contentiously, should the central bank publish its own policy-rate projection? 1 Proponents of this policy argue that communicating the policy-rate path helps economic agents better understand monetary policy and grants the central bank more influence over longer-term interest rates, thereby improving the central bank's ability to achieve its macroeconomic objectives.
Opponents argue that the policy-rate path is too uncertain to warrant being published and risks being interpreted as a statement of commitment. Nor has academic research arrived at a consensus.
Some recent research, suggests that publishing the path might be beneficial, or at least not detri-mental for economic outcomes; see, for example, Moessner and Nelson (2008) , Rudebusch and Williams (2008) and Andersson and Hofmann (2010) . However, Dale et al. (2011) argue that if the central bank publishes poor-quality forecasts then ultimately it risks becoming a source of distraction that is detrimental to the private sector's forecast precision. 2 With the benefits uncertain, few central banks have so far chosen to publish policy-rate forecasts so there is accordingly little data with which to assess the effect on private-sector policy expectations. Sveriges Riksbank took the step relatively early -in February 2007 -thereby becoming one of the first central banks with an endogenous policy rate projection. 3 Comparing policy-rate forecast precision before and after this date can shed light on the effect of the communication policy.
Our results show that the private sector's policy-rate expectations are neither unbiased nor efficient forecasts. Concerning forecast precision, we find there is no clear winner between survey expectations versus those inferred from market pricing. Interestingly, though, we find evidence that the forecasting precision of all types of policy-rate expectations has increased modestly since the Riksbank began publishing its own policy-rate projection.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and Section 4 concludes.
Data
Our data span the period September 2002 to January 2012 and are drawn from the most prominent survey of financial-market forecasters, Prospera, and from Swedish financial markets. We consider two real-time measures of expectations inferred from market pricing, one which has been calculated by the Riksbank using various financial contracts and assumptions about term premia (measure A) and another using only forward rate agreements and standardised assumptions about credit-market spreads and term premia (measure B). To ensure comparability of the information sets, expectations based on market pricing are calculated on the same dates the Prospera survey was conducted.
Survey-based expectations:
The Prospera survey has been conducted four times each year and collects information from households, firms and forecasters working in financial markets. We fo-cus on the latter set of respondents, denoted "money-market players", of which there are typically 40 to 50 respondents. Respondents give their forecast of the Riksbank's policy rate at several horizons, from one quarter up to 5 years, and we use the average forecast in our analysis.
Expectations inferred from market pricing: Market interest rates embed not only policy expectations but also credit spreads and risk premia that reflect the nature of the financial instrument and the investment horizon. The forecast accuracy of market-inferred policy expectations thus depend both on the ability of the market to forecast the central bank's policy actions and the accuracy of the spread and premia adjustments. 4 In light of this, we consider two market-based measures for Sweden:
Measure A: Policy-rate expectations inferred historically by the Riksbank using smooth NelsonSiegel type curves (Nelson and Siegel, 1987; Svensson, 1995) fitted to a range of financial instruments, including government bond yields, forward rate agreements (FRAs) and interest-rate swaps and futures. The underlying financial instruments and the assumptions about credit spreads and risk premia have varied over the years to suit data availability and market conditions. Using the parameters of the fitted curves, we extract policy expectations at exactly 3, 12 and 24 months ahead.
Measure B: Policy-rate expectations measured from FRAs without curve fitting but with a consistent real-time method for adjusting for credit spreads and a standardised interest-rate risk premia assumption. We use the fourth and eighth FRA contracts as indicators of policy expectations one and two years ahead. 5 FRAs do not settle directly on the Riksbank's policy rate but on a three-month interbank borrowing rate which embodies a credit spread for term bank lending. We extract real-time estimates of the anticipated interbank three-month credit spread by comparing derivatives which settle on overnight rates in the future with those that settle on three-month rates. 6 Finally, we assume a rule of thumb interest-rate risk premium of 1.5 basis points per month, amounting to 0.18 and 0.36 percentage points at 12 and 24 months respectively. 7 The survey-based and marked-inferred expectations are evaluated against outcomes of the Riksbank's policy rate -the repo rate -up to and including January 2012; the history of the policy rate is shown in Figure 1 . Three different forecast horizons are evaluated -one quarter, one year and two years -with 38, 35 and 31 data points respectively. Figures A2 to A4 in the appendix show the forecast errors, defined as actual repo rate minus expectation, at the three horizons. 
Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis is divided into three parts. First, we test for unbiasedness and efficiency.
Second, we evaluate the forecast accuracy of policy-rate expectations. These two stages are standard in the literature on forecast evaluation; see, for example, Mehra (2002) , Mankiw et al. (2003) , Baghestani (2008) and Jonsson and Österholm (2011) . Third, we compare the forecast precision of poli-cy-rate expectations in two subperiods to assess the impact of the Riksbank's communication strategy of publishing its own policy-rate projections.
Unbiasedness and efficiency
Defining the forecast error as is the forecast made at time t, the first column of Table 1 reports the mean errors. As is common in the macroeconomic literature, we also include a naïve forecast as a neutral benchmark.
As can be seen, all mean errors are negative, indicating that all measures of expectations at all horizons have been too high on average. The size of the mean error is larger the longer the forecast horizon. At the one-quarter horizon, average over-prediction ranges from -0.09 to -0.14 percentage points. At the two-year horizon, Prospera and market expectations have mean errors between -1.53
and -1.19. The naïve forecast attracts a less pronounced mean error -it is only -0.56. Does this over-prediction constitute a significant bias? This can be tested by running the regression Table 1 , all measures at all horizons are biased at reasonable significance levels, except the naïve forecast. This bias is to some extent driven by the large forecast errors associated with the sharp easing of monetary policy during the financial crisis. However, while these forecast errors constitute part of the explanation, they are probably not the only cause for our findings. 9
Biased forecasts constitute a violation of rational expectations under the commonly employed assumption that the forecaster has a symmetric quadratic loss function for the forecast errors. However, in reality we never know the loss function and therefore make no such claims here. 10 Instead we simply note that this result could be considered a warning sign regarding the rationality of the expectations formation process. Next, we test for efficient use of macroeconomic data when forming policy-rate expectations. A straightforward test of efficient use of data is based on the regression Results are given in Table 1 .
One-and two-year ahead policy expectations prove to be inefficient forecasts in that they do not make full use of the information contained in the current policy rate. While bias -as noted aboveis not necessarily a sign of lack of rationality, inefficient use of data is incompatible with rational expectations. One-quarter horizon expectations do, however, appear to be efficient with respect to the current policy rate.
Forecast accuracy
As the next step in our assessment of the policy-rate expectations, we compare the forecasting accuracy of the various measures. RMSEs are presented in the third column of Table 1 We test more formally for differences in forecasting precision using a modified Diebold and  is an error term. The null hypothesis is that the forecasting accuracy of the Prospera survey is equal to that of the market-inferred expectations. This is tested by comparing a transformation of the t-statistic on ˆ to the relevant critical value from the t-distribution. The results in Table 2 show that the null hypothesis can be rejected only for Prospera versus market-pricing measure A at the two-year horizon.
11 We use the modified test of Harvey et al. (1997) rather than the orignial one suggested by Diebold and Mariano (1995) since our samples are fairly small. should be noted that unlike the survey-based and financial-market inferred expectations, the RMSE of the naïve forecast is almost the same in the two samples. This suggests that something happened specifically amongst private-sector forecasters rather than to the macroeconomic environment more generally. The number of observations is small in both sub-samples so, to assess whether the differences in the pre-and post-communication strategy RMSEs are significant, we turn to a bootstrap exercise. 14 It is conducted the following way:
I. III. For a given measure, calculate
, that is, the difference in RMSEs between "Period 1" and "Period 2" for measure i.
IV.
Repeat steps I to III 20 000 times.
This provides us with two bootstrap distributions for differences in RMSEs between the two periods -one for each measure. If a difference of zero or smaller is found to be rare, we conclude that the observed difference in RMSEs is statistically significant. It turns out that for the Prospera expectations, 4.9 percent of the bootstrap sample has an RMSE difference that is smaller than zero. The corresponding number for Market pricing A is 1.1 percent (see Figure 2) . Hence, for both measures the drop in RMSEs between the pre-and post-communication samples is significant at conventional levels, but the evidence is stronger for the market-inferred expectations. Summing up this exercise, we find evidence that the Riksbank's policy of communicating its policyrate forecasts has been associated with an increase in private-sector policy-rate forecast precision. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have evaluated the forecasting properties of repo rate expectations in Sweden. At the one and two-year forecast horizons, both survey-based measures and market-pricing inferred measures of policy-rate expectations are biased and inefficient. These results are perhaps not too surprising given that survey-based forecasts of Swedish inflation and wage-growth have been
shown to have similar shortcomings; see Jonsson and Österholm (2011, 2012) . And despite the frequently cited disadvantages of both types of policy expectations, neither stand out as a clear winner concerning forecast accuracy.
Our results also indicate a modest improvement in the forecast precision of near-term policy expectations of private actors since the Riksbank began publishing its own policy-rate projection. This finding adds some empirical evidence to the discussion of the costs and benefits of central banks publishing their own policy-rate forecasts, a discussion that to date has largely been theoretical. A likely mechanism is that by making its forecasts more transparent the central bank provides information about its reaction function and methods that private-sector forecasters can employ in their own assessments. While our results should not be over-interpreted -we present evidence for one country -they are suggestive that the publication strategy yields benefits. 
